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Tale of the Monkey Trials: Chapter Three
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. .... '
For years, the Establishment Clause2 has been the center of
controversy between competing theories of natural evolution3 and
divine creation.4 These two antagonistic theories have clashed on a
constitutional battlefield over the appropriate means of educating
public school children about the origins of mankind. Supporters of
the Biblical version of creation have attempted to introduce their
views into public schools while those adopting the scientific view of
evolution have urged courts to maintain a strict separation between
church and state. Considering past United States Supreme Court
decisions, it appears that creationism is losing the battle.' Recently,
the United States Supreme Court sustained this trend when it chose
not to hear the case of Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education v.
Freiler,6 and let stand the decision of the United States Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals.7 When it comes to squaring the competing
theories of mankind's origin with the Constitution, the theory of
evolution has survived as the fittest.'
Copyright 2002, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
1. U.S. Const. amend. I (emphasis added). The first part of this statement is
commonly referred to as the "Establishment Clause," and the second part is known
as the "Free Exercise Clause."
2. Id.
3. "[E]volution has been understood to mean the theory which holds that man
has developed from some pre-existing lower type." Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363,
364 (Tenn. 1927).
4. The terms "divine creation" and "creationism" will be used interchangeably
throughout this paper to denote the theory of mankind's origin that God
spontaneously created human life on earth.
5. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987) (A
Louisiana statute requiring balanced treatment for creation science and evolution-
science was held to be a violation of the Establishment Clause. Under the statute,
if one theory was to be taught, then equal time had to be devoted to the teaching of
the other theory as well.). See also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 89 S. Ct.
266 (1968) (holding unconstitutional an Arkansas statute which prohibited teachers
in public or state-supported schools and institutions from teaching Darwin's theory
of evolution that mankind sprang forth from a lower species of animals).
6. 530 U.S. 1251, 120 S. Ct. 2706 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
7. Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1251, 120 S. Ct. 2706 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The
Fifth Circuit upheld the lower court's decision holding invalid a disclaimer adopted
by the Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education to be read before each high school
and elementary lesson on evolution. See infra note 9 for the text of the disclaimer.
8. Arguably, Edwards and Epperson are the two most important creationism
cases the United States Supreme Court has heard, and creationism lost both times.
Creationism again suffered defeat in Freiler.
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I. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FREILER CASE
On April 19, 1994, the Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education
adopted a disclaimer to be read in every elementary and high school
class prior to the teaching of any lesson regarding the theory of
evolution. 9 The apparent purpose of the disclaimer was to inform the
school children that the lesson they were about to receive would be
on the scientific theory of evolution and was not meant to "influence
or dissuade" them from adopting the "Biblical version of creation" or
any other concept that they may have learned at home. ° The
disclaimer also recognized the "basic right and privilege" of each
student to adopt his or her own beliefs regarding man's origin and
encouraged critical thinking by the students."
The parents of three public school students in Tangipahoa Parish
challenged the disclaimer seven months after its adoption. 2 The
parents claimed that it violated the Establishment Clause of the
United States Constitution. 3 The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana ruled against the Tangipahoa Parish
Board of Education and found the disclaimer to be in violation of the
Establishment Clause.'4 The District Court opined that the disclaimer
lacked a secular purpose. 5 The Fifth Circuit affirmed, but offered
different reasons.16 Contrary to the district court, the Fifth Circuit
9. The text of the disclaimer was as follows:
It is hereby recognized by the Tangipahoa Parish Board of
Education, that the lesson to be presented, regarding the origin of life and
matter, is known as the Scientific Theory of Evolution and should be
presented to inform students of the scientific concept and not intended toinfluence or dissuade the Biblical version of Creation or any other
concept.
It is further recognized by the Board of Education that it is thebasic right and privilege of each student to form his/her own opinion or
maintain beliefs taught by parents on this very important matter of the
origin of life and matter. Students are urged to exercise critical thinking
and gather all information possible and closely examine each alternative
toward forming an opinion.




13. Id. The parents also claimed a violation of the Establishment Clause of the
Louisiana Constitution; however, the case was decided solely on the claim that a
violation of the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution had
occurred. Id.
14. Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 975 F. Supp. 819 (E.D. La.
1997).
15. Id. at 829.
16. Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999).
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found that the disclaimer did have a secular purpose. 7 However, the
court ruled against the disclaimer because "the primary effect of the
disclaimer [was] to protect and maintain a particular religious
viewpoint, namely belief in the Biblical version of creation.'
' 8
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in Freiler;
however, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas, dissented.' 9 The dissenting justices stated their reasons as to
why the Court should have heard the case and why it should have
reversed the Fifth Circuit.2 °
A. Troubles with the Freiler Decision
For over two hundred years, the Supreme Court has played an
essential and remarkable role in government. The Court is charged
with the greatest duty of resolving the personal and governmental
conflicts that inevitably arise in this nation. As noted by Erwin N.
Griswold, "[t]hese conflicts are sometimes of extraordinary difficulty,
both intellectual and practical, and it should hardly be surprising that
their resolution is not always prompt or clear."'" For undertaking the
task of resolving these difficult issues, the Court has earned the respect
and understanding of our nation. Therefore, it is in the spirit of
contributing to that respect and understanding that the criticisms in this
comment are directed.
The Fifth Circuit and the United States Supreme Court each erred
in the Freiler case. By ignoring the purposes and limits of the
prohibition contained in the Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court
allowed a decision that will not even permit schools to acknowledge
the existence of a religious theory of creation.22 An examination of the
historical setting surrounding the enactment of the Establishment
Clause, as well as the intent of the men who drafted it, reveals that
these courts have strained too hard to maintain a rigid wall of
separation between church and state. Thus, they have deviated far
from the scope of the protections enshrined within the Establishment
Clause by allowing it to be used for a purpose not contemplated by the
Framers.
17. Id. at 346.
18. Id.
19. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ. v. Freiler, 530 U.S. 1251, 120 S. Ct. 2706
(2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
20. Id.
21. ErwinN. Griswold, Absolute is in the Dark-A Discussion ofthe Approach
of the Supreme Court to Constitutional Questions, 8 Utah L. Rev. 167, 167 (1963).
22. See infra note 70 and accompanying text for the purposes underlying the
Establishment Clause.
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By denying certiorari in Freiler, the United States Supreme Court
allowed an "absolutist" interpretation of the Establishment Clause.23
An absolutist viewpoint is problematic for two reasons. First, the
approach involves "a failure to exercise the responsibilities-and
indeed the pains-of judging. By ignoring factors relevant to sound
decision, it inevitably leads to wrong results. 24 When the Supreme
Court allowed such a decision to stand, it violated its duty to protect
our constitutional freedoms 25 through sound interpretation of the
Constitution.26  Through the formulation of its own absolutist
viewpoint, the Fifth Circuit decided Freiler in a manner that does not
accord with the Constitution. The United States Supreme Court should
not have tolerated the decision and should not have denied certiorari.
Our courts should interpret the Constitution in a manner consistent
with the intent of the Framers, and when a lower court fails to do so,
the Supreme Court should correct the decision.27 Otherwise, the
credibility of judicial decision-making erodes.28
Second, this decision creates potential problems for public school
curricula in the future. As a result of the Freiler decision, a public
23. Griswold, supra note 21. The absolutist viewpoint narrowly construes the
language of the Establishment Clause to mean that "no law" means no law.
However, this viewpoint is flawed, for it fails to adequately interpret the essential
words "establishment of religion." According to Griswold, "the words of the First
Amendment... cannot be given sound meaning and effect merely through a
mechanically absolutist approach." Id. at 171-72.
24. Id. at 181.
25. "The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital
than in the community of American schools." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
487, 81 S. Ct. 247, 251 (1960).
26. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 ("It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is.... So if a law be in opposition to the constitution ... the court must determine
which of these conflicting rules governs the case.... [T]he constitution, and not
[the opposing law], must govern...."). The process of determining whether a law
is in conflict with the Constitution first requires an interpretation of the
constitutional provision at issue.
27. See generally William A. Aniskovich, In Defense of the Framers' Intent:
Civic Virtue, The Bill of Rights, and the Framers' Science of Politics, 75 Va. L.
Rev. 1311 (1989). This article acknowledges the debate regarding whether the
Constitution should be interpreted using an "interpretivist" or "noninterpretivist"
approach. The interpretivist approach interprets the Constitution based on its text
and the intentions of the Framers. The noninterpretivist approach argues that the
Constitution should be interpreted from sources beyond the text and the intent of
the draftsmen. But no matter which side of the debate one is on, the intent of the
Framers is always important when construing ambiguous constitutional provisions.
28. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986). Justice
White wrote for the majority that "[t]he Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest
to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no
cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution." Id. at 194, 106 S.
Ct. at 2846.
676 [Vol. 62
school, when discussing the origins of mankind, cannot even
acknowledge that alternative religious theories of mankind's origin
exist, and it certainly cannot tell a student that he may pursue such
theories on his own. This decision stifles freedom of thought. If
children are not allowed to know that religions have theories of
mankind's origin, then it appears that no subject that is remotely
related to religion may be discussed in public schools. This decision
paves the way for the courts to tell schools that they may no longer
discuss religion's impact and influence on history, art, philosophy,
and so forth.29 The Freiler decision is indeed a slippery slope.
The Supreme Court should have granted certiorari in Freiler,
reversed the Fifth Circuit, and affirmatively squared the
Establishment Clause with its original purposes by asking one simple
question: Is the disclaimer "a law respecting an establishment of
religion?"3 In answering this question, the Court should have begun
by correcting the Fifth Circuit's erroneous application of the Lemon
test." Then, it should have discussed the outcome of the case under
both the endorsement32 and coercion tests.33 Finally, in order to quiet
some of the confusion surrounding Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, the Court should have consolidated the three
Establishment Clause tests to create one workable standard for courts
to use in the future.
This comment begins with an exposition of the history
surrounding the Establishment Clause and describes the intent of the
men who drafted it. Next, it briefly summarizes Establishment
Clausejurisprudence in the context of the "Monkey Trial"'34 cases and
follows up with a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's erroneous decision
29. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42, 101 S. Ct. 192, 194 (1980) (The
Supreme Court stated that "the Bible may constitutionally be used [in public
schools] in an appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics, comparative
religion, or the like.").
30. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985). There, the
Supreme Court, before deciding the case, framed the issue as follows: "[T]he
narrow question for decision is whether § 16-1-20.1, which authorizes a period of
silence for 'meditation or voluntary prayer,' is a law respecting the establishment
of religion within the meaning of the First Amendment." Id. at 41-42, 105 S. Ct.
at 2482 (emphasis added); "[O]ur duty is to determine whether the statute or
practice at issue is a step toward establishing a state religion." Id. at 89, 105 S. Ct.
at 2507 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
31. See infra note 74 for a brief description of the Lemon test.
32. See infra note 75 for a brief description of the endorsement test.
33. See infra note 76 for a brief description of the coercion test.
34. Collision ofFaith, Science, Reason, Baton Rouge Advocate, July 22,2000,
at 8B. The phrase "the Monkey Trial" was coined in 1925 by H.L. Mencken, a
reporter for the Baltimore Evening Sun, to describe the case of Scopes v. State, 289
S.W. 363 (Tenn. 1927). This was the first case to deal with the issue of creationism
versus evolution in public schools.
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in Freiler. This comment ends with a criticism of the Fifth Circuit's
application of the Lemon test. Then, resorting to the intent of the
Framers who molded the Establishment Clause, it proposes a solution
to the confusion surrounding Establishment Clause jurisprudence by
offering a new, simpler test for courts to use when confronted with
alleged Establishment Clause violations. Finally, applying this new
standard, the Freiler disclaimer35 is put to the test.
B. Historical Origins of the Establishment Clause
Speaking for the Court, Justice Holmes once wrote that "a page
of history is worth a volume of logic."36 And, as the United States
Supreme Court has noted, "interpretation of the Establishment Clause
should 'compor[t] with what history reveals [is] the contemporaneous
understanding of its guarantees."'3a  Therefore, before further
exploration of the Freiler decision or the jurisprudence surrounding
it, a brief history of the Establishment Clause is in order.
From the seventeenth century until the mid-eighteenth century,
state establishment of religion was viewed much differently than it is
viewed today. At that time, nearly every colony had an "established"
religion," meaning that each colonial government "established" the
35. See supra note 9 for the text of the disclaimer.
36. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349, 41 S. Ct. 506, 507
(1921).
37. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 632, 112 S. Ct. 2649,2679 (1992) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984)).
See also Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3335 (1983)
("[H]istorical evidence sheds light not only on what the draftsmen intended the
Establishment Clause to mean, but also on how they thought that Clause applied [to
modem practices]"); County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 670, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3142 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he meaning of the
[Establishment] Clause is to be determined by reference to historical practices and
understandings."); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2519
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The true meaning of the Establishment Clause
can only be seen in its history. As drafters of our Bill of Rights, the Framers
inscribed the principles that control today. Any deviation from their intentions
frustrates the permanence of that Charter and will.., lead to... unprincipled
decisionmaking .. ").
38. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 67 S. Ct. 504 (1947). In Everson,
Justice Black, writing for the majority, gave an influential view of the history of the
Establishment Clause. According to Justice Black, "[tihe centuries immediately
before and contemporaneous with the colonization of America had been filled with
turmoil, civil strife, and persecutions, generated in large part by established sects
determined to maintain their absolute political and religious supremacy." Id. at 8-9,
67 S. Ct. at 508. See also The Supreme Court's Holy Battles, A Companion Guide
2 (1989) [hereinafter Holy Battles]; Robert S. Alley, The Supreme Court on Church
and State 8 (1988) (In seventeenth century colonies, with few exceptions, "the
universal practice was that of establishment.").
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majority religion and gave it tax funds and privileges." The chosen
church was to be the only church in the colony, and the clergy were
given public support in the form of cash, land, and often goods such
as tobacco.' 0 Dissenters of the established church were either fined,
persecuted, or killed.'
The most significant exception to the colonial establishment of
religion was the Rhode Island experience led by Roger Williams.
42
A vigorous advocate for pure religious freedom, Williams believed
that the church was to be kept separate and distinct from the
corruptive influences of the state. 3 Williams was motivated by the
belief that any support of religious establishments by the state would
lead to persecution by either restraining individuals from exercising
their desired choice of religion, or by compelling individuals to
exercise a form of religion that their consciences forbade.'
According to Williams, if the government could use religion, then the
39. Everson, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S. Ct. 504 (1947). In his exploration of
Establishment Clause history, Justice Black stated:
The very charters granted by the English Crown to the individuals and
companies designated to make the laws which would control the destinies
of the colonials authorized these individuals and companies to erect
religious establishments which all, whether believers or non-believers,
would be required to support and attend... These practices became so
commonplace as to shock the freedom-loving colonials into a feeling of
abhorrence. The imposition of taxes to pay ministers' salaries and to build
and maintain churches and church property aroused their indignation.
Id. at 9-11, 67 S. Ct. at 508-09. See also Holy Battles, supra note 38, at 2; Leonard
W. Levy, The Establishment Clause: Religion and the First Amendment xxi (1994)
("The evidence demonstrates that by an establishment of religion the framers meant
any government policy that aided religion or its agencies, the religious
establishments.").
40. Ronald B. Flowers, That Godless Court? 10 (1994).
41. Everson, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S. Ct. 504 (1947). As a result of established
religion in the colonies, Justice Black recounted:
With the power of government supporting them, at various times and
places, Catholics had persecuted Protestants, Protestants had persecuted
Catholics, Protestant sects had persecuted other Protestant sects, Catholics
of one shade of belief had persecuted Catholics [of a varying belief], and
all of these had from time to time persecuted Jews. In efforts to force
loyalty to whatever religious group happened to be on top and in league
with the government of a particular time and place, men and women had
been fined, cast in jail, cruelly tortured, and killed.
Id. at 9, 67 S. Ct. at 508. See also Holy Battles, supra note 38, at 2.
42. Roger Williams, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison had a profound
influence on the underpinnings of the Establishment Clause. Although Williams
did not directly influence Jefferson or Madison when the Establishment Clause was
drafted, his contribution to the First Amendment is nevertheless important for the
indirect influence his methodologies had on the drafters. Timothy L. Hall,
Separating Church and State: Roger Williams and Religious Liberty 117 (1998).
43. Flowers, supra note 40, at 11.
44. Hall, supra note 42, at 125.
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government could corrupt it (as had been done in Europe)45 and use
it to control the people.46 As a result, he favored total individual
freedom with respect to religion and did not allow the establishment
of a religion in Rhode Island.47 To Williams, it was too dangerous to
individual freedom to place the power of religion in the hands of the
government.48
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison agreed with the example
set by Roger Williams. For differing reasons, they both believed that
religion and government should not mix. Rather than favoring
separation of church and state out of fear that the government would
seek to control the people through religion, Madison feared that an
established religion could be used to control the government.49
Jefferson, on the other hand, simply believed that the state lacked all
jurisdiction in the realm of religion.5"
In addition to drawing from the Roger Williams experiment in
Rhode Island, Thomas Jefferson was also motivated to separate
church and state by the teachings of John Locke. Locke was a strict
advocate for religious liberty and freedom of conscience.5" He
believed that democracy was not possible without freedom of
religion, and he argued that "religious intolerance could be a threat
to democracy itself.... "52 According to Locke, people who live in
a free society should be able to freely choose how to worship, if they
choose to do so at all.53
From these teachings, Jefferson extracted the idea that
government and religion had to be separated in order to preserve
45. Prior to and during the 1780s, in "several European countries, one national
religion, such as the Church of England in Great Britain, was established." County
of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492
U.S. 573, 646, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3129 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
46. Francis G. Lee, Wall of Controversy: Church-State Conflict in America 8
(1986).
47. Flowers, supra note 40, at 11.
48. M. Howe, The Garden and the Wilderness: Religion and Government in
American Constitutional History 6 (1965) ("Worldly corruptions ...might
consume the churches if sturdy fences against the wilderness were not
maintained.").
49. Lee, supra note 46, at 8.
50. Holy Battles, supra note 38, at 9. See also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
623, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2674 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) ("Jefferson necessarily
condemned what, in modem terms, we call official endorsement of religion. He
accordingly construed the Establishment Clause to forbid not simply state coercion,
but also state endorsement, of religious belief and observance.").
51. Kenneth R. Craycraft, Jr., The American Myth of Religious Freedom 69
(1999).
52. Darien A. McWhirter, Exploring the Constitution: The Separation of




democracy. To Jefferson, religion was a private, personal matter that
the state had no authority to touch.54 If the two intermingled,
according to Jefferson, democracy would erode, and liberty, freedom
of expression, individual thought, and religion would all sustainharm. '
In 1779, Jefferson introduced the Virginia Statute For Religious
Freedom to the Virginia House of Delegates in an effort to curtail the
practice of established religion in Virginia. 6 The bill's chief effect
was to guarantee the free exercise of religion and to abolish religious
establishments.5 7  After years of debate and much trouble with
Patrick Henry, 8 James Madison was able to secure passage of
Jefferson's bill in Virginia in 1786." The impact of this legislation
forever preserved freedom of religion for Virginians. Jefferson's
separationist ideals, memorialized in Virginia, would soon find
themselves woven within the fabric of the First Amendment.'
54. Jefferson's view was captured in the preamble to the Virginia Bill for
Religious Liberty where he wrote the following:
Almighty God hath created the mind free; that all attempts to influence it
by temporal punishments orburthens, or by civil incapacitations, tend only
to beget habits of hypocrisy and meanness, and are a departure from the
plan of the Holy author of our religion, who being Lord both of body and
mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on either...; that to
compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of
opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical; that even the
forcing him to support this or that teacher of his own religious persuasion,
is depriving him of the comfortable liberty of giving his contributions to
the particular pastor, whose morals he would make his [own].
Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, 1619 Leg., 1st Sess. (Va. 1619); Henry S.
Commager, Documents of American History 125 (Dixon R. Fox ed., 1944).
55. Holy Battles, supra note 38, at 9.
56. Id. at 4. The bill provided the following:
[N]o man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship,
place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested,
or burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer, on account
of his religious opinions or belief; but that all men shall be free to profess,
and by argument to maintain, their opinions in matters ofreligion, and that
the same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities.
Id. at 4-5.
57. Id. at 4.
58. Patrick Henry, in 1783, proposed a bill opposite to Jefferson's which called
for an annual tax on the citizens of Virginia to contribute to the state's support of
the Christian religion. Jefferson vehemently opposed this plan along side James
Madison. So bitter was Jefferson toward Henry that he wrote to Madison: "What
we have to do, I think, is devoutly pray for his [Henry's] death." Eventually, due
to the efforts of Madison, Henry's bill was defeated, leaving open the door for
passage of Jefferson's bill. Id. at 5, 6.
59. Id. at 6.
60. The Supreme Court recognized that "the provisions of the First
Amendment, in the drafting and adoption of which Madison and Jefferson played
such leading roles, had the same objective and were intended to provide the same
2002]
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Like Jefferson, Madison was also adamant about abolishing
establishment and ensuring the separation of church and state. In the
fight against Patrick Henry's proposed religion tax, Madison wrote
his great Memorial and Remonstrance against the legislation.
According to Justice Black, in the Memorial and Remonstrance,
Madison did the following:
[He] eloquently argued that a true religion did not need the
support of law; that no person, either believer or non-believer,
should be taxed to support a religious institution of any kind;
that the best interest of a society required that the minds of
men always be wholly free; and that cruel persecutions were
the inevitable result of government-established religions.6 '
Thus, Madison, like Jefferson, believed that the government had no
jurisdiction in the realm of religion.62
Madison was also deeply motivated by a fear that faction might
undermine the fledgling federal government.63 Madison worried that
established religion would lead to large religious sects that could
dominate politically. He advocated freedom of religion so that a
multitude of religions could flourish and diminish the possibility that
one, over-bearing religious sect would rise and dominate the political
arena.64 While drafting the Constitution, Madison adhered to
separationist ways, and no powers over matters of religion were
given to the government in the body of the Constitution.65
Apparently, Madison's position was that if the Constitution was void
of express language giving Congress power to legislate concerning
matters of religion, then Congress was powerless to do so.
Because of this belief, Madison felt that a bill of rights was
unnecessary to protect individual religious freedom. However,
Thomas Jefferson and the majority of people in many states disagreed
protection against governmental intrusion on religious liberty as the Virginia
statute." Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13, 67 S. Ct. 504, 510 (1947).
61. Id. at 12, 67 S. Ct. at 509.
62. In his "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,
1785," James Madison wrote, in part:
The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and
conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it
as these may dictate .... We maintain therefore that in matters of
Religion, no man's right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society,
and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.
The Complete Madison 299-301 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953).
63. Kenneth R. Craycraft, Jr., The American Myth of Religious Freedom 76(1999).
64. Id. (discussing The Federalist, No. 51 (James Madison) in which Madison
argued the need for the government to build legal and political institutions that
could dilute the collective influence of religion).
65. Levy, supra note 39, at 77-80.
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with him. Therefore, in an effort to secure ratification of the
Constitution, Madison presented to the first Congress a bill of rights
intended to protect individual liberties, including religious freedom,
by explicitly limiting the power of the federal government.66 After
ratification in 1791," the first sixteen words of the First Amendment
guaranteed religious freedom in the United States. 8
Soon after the adoption of the Bill of Rights, Thomas Jefferson,
in a letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, wrote the following:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely
between man and his God; that he owes account to none other
for his faith or his worship; that the legislative powers of the
government reach actions only, and not opinions, I
contemplate with sovereign reverence that [the Establishment
Clause has built] a wall of separation between church and
State.69
Thus, the famous phrase "wall of separation between church and
State" was born. Based on the example set by Roger Williams and
the teachings of John Locke, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison
were able to firmly draw the line between church and state by sewing
religious freedom into the fabric of our nation. The intent of the
Framers--"that no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any
religious worship, place or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be
enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor
shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinion or
[beliefs]" 7 -was successfully preserved in the Constitution.
66. Id. at 69, 77-80; see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 98, 105 S. Ct.
2479,2511 (1985) (Madison's "sponsorship of the Amendments in the House was
obviously not that of a zealous believer in the necessity of the Religion Clauses, but
of one who felt it might do some good, could do no harm, and would satisfy those
who had ratified the Constitution on the condition that Congress propose a Bill of
Rights.").
67. For the history of the debates surrounding ratification of the First
Amendment, see Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-114, 105 S. Ct. 2479,2508-19
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
68. U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.") For James
Madison's interpretation of the Establishment Clause, see 1 Annals of Cong. 424,
730 (1789) ("[Madison] apprehended the meaning of the words to be that Congress
should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor
compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience.").
69. McWhirter, supra note 52, at 4.
70. Justice Black stated in Everson v. Board. of Education. that the
Establishment Clause was intended to provide the same protection against
governmental intrusion on religious liberty as Jefferson's famous Virginia Bill for
Religious Liberty. 330 U.S. 1, 13, 67 S. Ct. 504, 510 (1947). See also Flowers,
supra note 40, at 17 (The Founders wrote that "[t]he government was not to
establish one religion, neither was it to establish multiple religions ... government
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This is the purpose behind the Establishment Clause that the
United States Supreme Court has turned to when evaluating alleged
Establishment Clause violations.71 Regarding theories of mankind's
origin, the Supreme Court has held fast to the Jeffersonian purpose
behind the Establishment Clause and erected a wall of separation
between religious versions of creation and public schools.
Unfortunately, in an effort to expand this trend, the court in Freiler
mistakenly reinforced the wall when it should have instead carved out
a window.72
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TESTS
Before examining the saga of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, a brief explanation of the standards used by the courts
to gauge Establishment Clause violations is appropriate. Over the
course of time, three different tests have been developed by the
Supreme Court for ferreting out Establishment Clause violations:73
the Lemon test,74 the endorsement test,75 and the coercion test.76
was to be limited."); Levy, supra note 39, at xvii (commenting on the history of the
establishment clause and how the view has always been that "government aid to
religion, even without preference to any church, violates the Establishment
Clause").
71. McWhirter, supra note 52, at 4. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 164 (1878) (Chief Justice Waite wrote for a unanimous court that Thomas
Jefferson's statement "may be accepted almost as an authoritative declaration ofthe
scope and effect of the [religion clauses]" of the First Amendment.).
72. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ v. Freiler, 530 U.S. 1251, 120 S. Ct. 2706
(2000).
73. Id. at 2707.
74. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S. Ct. 2105 (1971). Under the
Lemon test, three prongs must be met in order for a law to withstand constitutional
scrutiny. If any of the three prongs fails, the law in question fails. According to
Lemon, a law is unconstitutional if: (1) it lacks a secular legislative purpose; (2) its
primary effect either advances or inhibits religion; or (3) it causes the government
to become excessively entangled with religion. Id. at 612-613, 91 S. Ct. at 2111.
Under the first prong, courts perform a two-step analysis to determine if the
law in question has a secular'purpose. First, a "sham" inquiry is done to decide
whether the law actually furthers the secular purposes articulated by its makers.
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586-87, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2579 (1987). If all
of the purposes are found to be a sham, the inquiry ends and the law fails. But, if
even one of the given purposes is genuine, then the inquiry continues to determine
whether the genuine purpose is secular in nature. A permissible secular objective
is one that neither advances nor disapproves of religion. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 56, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2489 (1985). To briefly summarize, under the first
prong, a court must ask first if the questionable law actually furthers the purposes
given for it by its makers, and second, the court must decide if those given purposes
are secular-neither advancing nor inhibiting religion. If the first prong is met, the
court should move on to the second.
Under prong two, a court looks past the given purposes for the law and
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Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has offered no guidance as to what
circumstances trigger each of the individual tests." Therefore, courts
faced with alleged Establishment Clause violations have been left to
choose, on their own, which of the three tests to employ. The multi-
test analysis has led to a collection of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence which courts are quick to admit is "rife with
confusion.""8  This confusion is problematic in that erroneous
decisions are apt to occur when a court is not given a clear standard
to work with.7
analyzes its actual effects. Any state law which actively endorses or disapproves
of religion is unconstitutional. Typically, laws that "aid one religion, aid all
religions, or favor one religion over another" are considered to endorse religion and
are therefore invalid. Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337, 346
(1999). The government cannot promote religion in any way under prong two;
however, there is an exception. Various courts have said that "where the benefit to
religion or to a church is no more than indirect, remote, or incidental . . . 'no
realistic danger [exists] that the community would think that the [contested
government practice] was endorsing religion or any particular creed."' Id. (quoting
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395, 113
S. Ct. 2141, 2148 (1993)). Thus, a law with a valid secular purpose that gives a
minuscule benefit to religion should survive under prongs one and two.
Prong three merely requires that the law not create an excessive
entanglement with religion. If the law becomes too entangled with religion, the law
will fail. In 1997, the Supreme Court suggested that the excessive entanglement
inquiry could be dispensed with as a separate inquiry and combined with Lemon's
secular purpose prong. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
Therefore, it is no longer clear that this is, in fact, a separate prong.
75. County ofAllegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989). Because the Supreme Court has
expressed its disapproval of the Lemon test in various contexts, other tests have
arisen to take its place. One such test is the endorsement test. Under the
endorsement test, "the court seeks to determine whether the government endorses
religion by means of the challenged action." Freiler, 185 F.3d at 343. A violation
of the endorsement test occurs when the state's action "conveys a message that
religion is 'favored,' 'preferred,' or 'promoted' over other beliefs." Id. Analysis
under the endorsement test is "similar to analysis pursuant to [Lemon's second
prong]," and state actions which impermissibly advance religion have been held to
simultaneously fail Lemon's second prong and the endorsement test. Id. at 346.
76. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). The coercion test
analyzes the coercive effect that state-sponsored religious activity has on the public.
Freiler, 185 F.3d at 343. Under this test, a state's activity will violate the
Establishment Clause when "(1) the government directs (2) a formal religious
exercise (3) in such a way as to oblige the participation of objectors." Jones v.
Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 970 (5th Cir. 1992). According to
Justice Kennedy, coercion is any state-sponsored activity that "places public
pressure, as well as peer pressure," on people attending the event. Lee, 505 U.S.
at 593, 112 S. Ct. at 2658.
77. Freiler, 185 F.3d at 344.
78. Id. at 343.
79. With these three tests in mind, it is easy to see how courts might become
confused when faced with an alleged Establishment Clause violation. How is a
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III. TALE OF THE "MONKEY TRIALS"
The first case to address the issue of creationism versus evolution
was Scopes v. State.0 At the time of the case, Tennessee had a
statute that forbade in public schools the teaching of any theory that
"denie[d] the story of the divine creation of man as taught in the
Bible and [taught] instead that man [had] descended from a lower
order of animals."' Mr. Scopes had been convicted of violating this
statute. The Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed the conviction on
procedural grounds, but held the Tennessee statute to be
constitutional. The court reasoned that a state, in dealing with its
own employees engaged in its own work, was not limited by the
prohibitions incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment. 2
Years later, the United States Supreme Court was not as lenient
as the Tennessee court toward anti-evolution legislation. Epperson
v. Arkansas3 involved an Arkansas statute similar to the Tennessee
statute in Scopes. The Arkansas statute forbade teachers in public
schools from teaching "the theory or doctrine that mankind ascended
or descended from a lower order of animals."" The Court declared
the law unconstitutional, finding that it conflicted "with the
constitutional prohibition of state laws respecting an establishment
of religion.""
Crucial to the Court's decision was its finding that the Arkansas
statute violated principles of neutrality. According to the Court, the
"[government] may not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy
of no-religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or
court to choose which test should be employed in a given situation? Should all
three tests always be used to analyze every situation? Or, is a court free to choose
the test it feels will best help it reach its desired result? If state action fails Lemon's
second prong, does this mean it automatically fails the endorsement test? If so,
what is the point of even having the endorsement test? Suppose state activity fails
the Lemon and endorsement tests but passes the coercion test. Should the law stand
or fall? These questions have all been left unanswered by courts, and the Supreme
Court has offered no guidance in seeking resolution of these issues. The ambiguous
situation created by having the three tests can lead to bad results because a court
with a preconceived notion of what it considers to be the right result has too muchdiscretion in choosing the test that best conforms to its ready-made answer. Freiler
v. Tangipahoa BoardofEducation is a perfect example of what can go wrong given
the confusion surrounding Establishment Clause jurisprudence today.
80. 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. 1927).
81. Tenn. Anti-Evolution Act, ch. 27, § 1 (1925).
82. Scopes, 289 S.W. at 367.
83. 393 U.S. 97, 89 S. Ct. 266 (1968).
84. 1929 Ark. Acts, Initiated Act No. 1; Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 80-1627, 80-1628
(1960 Repl. Vol.).
85. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 103, 89 S. Ct. at 270.
686 [Vol. 62
religious theory against another or even against the militant
opposite." 6 Further, quoting from Everson v. Board ofEducation, the
Court noted that "[n]either [a State nor the Federal Government] can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another."8 7 In other words, a state may not create laws or
procedures in public schools that "aid or oppose" any religion. 8 In
essence, the Court used an approach similar to the endorsement test to
strike down the Arkansas statute. Interestingly, in dicta, the Court
stated that a study of religions or of the Bible, as part of a literattire or
history curriculum, presented objectively as secular education, could
be presented in public school without violating the Establishment
Clause. 9 Thus, a neutral and objective presentation of religion in a
public school was said to survive constitutional inquiry.9"
In its findings of fact, the Court held that the actual purpose of the
law at issue was not neutral and objective. Instead, it found that the
statute was created to prevent teachers from discussing the theory of
evolution because it conflicted with the Biblical version of creation.
The motivation behind the statute was to suppress the teaching of
evolution.9 This purpose violated religious neutrality by preferring the
religious theory to the scientific theory; thus, the law had to fall.Y"
The next challenge to the Establishment Clause came from
"balanced treatment" legislation, a type of law that required equal time
be devoted to creationism and evolution theories in public schools.
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the issue of"balanced
treatment" in Edwards v. Aguillard.93 Louisiana had passed a law
called the "Creationism Act," which forbade "the teaching of the
theory of evolution in public schools unless accompanied by
instruction in 'creation science."' 94 Neither theory was required to be
taught; however, if one was taught, the other had to be given equal
class time.
The Court decided the case primarily under the Lemon test and
held that the Louisiana Creationism Act was unconstitutional. The
86. Id. at 104, 89 S. Ct. at 270.
87. Id. at 106, 89 S. Ct. at 271 (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.
1, 15, 67 S. Ct. 504, 511 (1947)).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. After Freiler, it is not so clear that this is true anymore.
91. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 109, 89 S. Ct. at 273.
92. Soon after the Epperson decision, a similar statute was declared
unconstitutional in the State of Mississippi. See Smith v. State, 242 So. 2d 692
(Miss. 1970) (holding unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause a statute
making it unlawful for any teacher employed by the state to teach that mankind
ascended or descended from a lower order of animals).
93. 482 U.S. 578, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987).
94. Id. at 581, 107 S. Ct. at 2576.
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Court found that the Act lacked a valid secular purpose and,
therefore, failed Lemon's first prong." In addition, the court also
utilized the endorsement test, holding that the Act "endorse[d]
religion in violation of the First Amendment."96
The first two chapters in the tale of the "monkey trials" prohibit
antievolution legislation and balanced treatment legislation
respectively. These chapters comport with the purpose of the
Establishment Clause-to prohibit the state from taking an active role
in adVancing religion upon people's lives. It is understandable that
legislation forbidding the teaching of evolution is unconstitutional
because such legislation actively seeks to turn students away from the
theory of evolution and toward the theory of creation. It is even more
understandable that legislation forcing students to partake in
creationism lectures is unconstitutional because clearly this
legislation coerces students to partake in religious education.
A problem exists though with the third chapter recently written
by the Fifth Circuit in Freiler and acquiesced to by the United States
Supreme Court. The Freiler chapter poses a problem for our society
because it stretches the Establishment Clause to an extreme limit that
could not have been contemplated by its Framers. This decision does
not merely tell the state that it cannot advance religion; it tells the
state that it cannot even acknowledge the existence of a particular
religious viewpoint.
IV. SUBSTANCE OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION
The Fifth Circuit's sole inquiry in Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish
Board of Education was whether the disclaimer 7 at issue
contravened the First Amendment's Establishment Clause.98 In a
decision that looked past the explicit wording of the disclaimer, the
court ultimately concluded that the disclaimer had, in fact, breached
the wall of separation between church and state. 99
The court began by recognizing the freedom that states have in
prescribing academic curricula in their public schools. Next, relying
on the landmark decision of Epperson v. Arkansas,'° the court
commented that this freedom is limited in scope by the Constitution
such that "[s]tates may not require that teaching and learning be
95. Id. at 591, 107 S. Ct. at 2581 ("The preeminent purpose of the Louisiana
Legislature was clearly to advance the religious viewpoint that a supernatural being
created humankind.").
96. Id. at 593, 107 S. Ct. at 2583.
97. See supra note 9 for the text of the disclaimer.
98. 185 F.3d 337, 342 (5th Cir. 1999)..
99. Id. at 349.
100. 393 U.S. 97, 89 S. Ct. 266 (1968).
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tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or
dogma."'01
The court then discussed the Lemon, endorsement, and coercion
tests to determine whether certain state action is violative of the
Establishment Clause.0" After commenting on the tests, the court
described the state of Establishment Clause jurisprudence as "rife
with confusion."'0 3 But, noted the court, not all three tests must be
employed; any one test could be used in isolation to analyze the state
action.'°4 According to the court, the choice of which test to employ
should not be made arbitrarily; instead, the decision "rests upon the
nature of the Establishment Clause violation asserted."'0 5 Noting that
the state action at issue, the disclaimer, did not force students to
participate in a formal religious exercise, the court eliminated from
consideration the coercion test.'0 6 It turned its attention instead to the
Lemon test.107
From the outset of its discussion of the Lemon test, the court was
quick to point out that the Lemon test was "widely criticized and
occasionally ignored," but that it "continue[d] to govern
Establishment Clause cases."'0 8 Despite doubts about the viability of
the Lemon test, the court chose to proceed under its guidance.'0 9
Beginning with the first prong, the court looked at whether the
disclaimer had a truly secular purpose."0 It noted that "a statute
motivated in part by a religious purpose may satisfy Lemon's
[secular] purpose prong.""' All that is required is that "a sincere
secular purpose for the contested state action must exist; even if that
secular purpose is but one in a sea of religious purposes.""..2
The court then turned to the School Board's professed purposes
for mandating the disclaimer." 3 Deferring to the purposes given by
101. Freiler, 185 F.3d at 343 (citations omitted).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 343-44.
105. Id. at 344.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997) (Lemon
test once again employed to analyze a school aid program). This case reaffirmed
the continued utility of the Lemon test.
109. 185 F.3d at 344.
110. "Secular" purpose is defined as a "[w]orldly, as distinguished from
spiritual" purpose. Black's Law Dictionary 1356 (7th ed. 1999).
111. Freiler, 185 F.3d at 344. See Wallace v. Jaffe, 472 U.S. 38, 56, 105 S. Ct.
2479, 2489 (1985).
112. 185 F.3d at 344.
113. Id. The School Board listed three purposes: "(1) to encourage informed
freedom of belief, (2) to disclaim any orthodoxy of belief that could be inferred
from the exclusive placement of evolution in the curriculum, and (3) to reduce
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the School Board, yet not blindly relying on them, the court
investigated whether the disclaimer actually furthered those
articulated reasons." 4 But before deciding whether the Board'spurposes were secular, the court had to determine whether they were
genuine, or instead, a "sham."'"15
As for the first purpose, that the disclaimer "encourag[ed]
informed freedom of belief or critical thinking by the students," the
court looked past the text of the disclaimer and found that "the
disclaimer as a whole further[ed] a contrary purpose, namely the
protection and maintenance of a particular religious viewpoint."'"16
It reasoned that the structure of the disclaimer was intended to tell
school children "that evolution as taught in the classroom need not
affect what they already know," and that this message contradicted
the alleged purpose of encouraging critical thinking and keeping an
open mind."7 Thus, the first purpose was found to be a sham.
However, as to the second and third purposes held out by the
School Board in support of the disclaimer, the court found them to
be genuine. Because the disclaimer acknowledged the existence of
the alternative Biblical version of creation and reminded children
that they could adopt their parent's views of man's origin, the
disclaimer did in fact "disclaim an orthodoxy of belief' that could be
implied from the exclusive lessons concerning scientific evolution.
It also "reduce[d] offense" to parents and children caused by the
teaching of evolution in public schools." 8 Using these two sincere
purposes, the court continued its inquiry by determining whether
those purposes were permissible secular objectives."' Attempting
to accommodate the religious viewpoints, and avoiding "callous
indifference,"' 2 ° the court found that the School Board's second and
third purposes had valid secular objectives.' 2' The court
acknowledged that "local school boards need not turn a blind eye to




116. Id. at 344-45.
117. 185 F.3d at 345.
118. Id.
119. Id, The court kept in mind that "a purpose is no less secular simply
because it is infused with a religious element" and that the Lemon test does not
require that "the contested law's purpose be unrelated to religion" since the
Constitution requires "accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions." Id.(citations omitted).
120. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314, 72 S. Ct. 679, 684 (1952)(cautioning that courts must avoid "callous indifference" towards religious
objectives).
121. Freiler, 185 F.3d at 345.
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the concerns of students and parents troubled by the teaching of
evolution in public classrooms." '22
The court next analyzed Lemon's second prong: whether,
regardless of the state's purpose, the action actually conveyed a message
of endorsement or advancement.124 If the disclaimer was found to
endorse, advance, or benefit religion, then it would have to be stricken.
However, said the court, "where the benefit to religion... [was] no
more than indirect, remote, or incidental," the contested state action
would not be considered an unconstitutional endorsement of religion.
25
The court then proceeded to decide whether the disclaimer
endorsed, advanced, or benefitted religion, and, if it did, whether the
effects were merely indirect, remote, or incidental.1 26 The court
began by focusing on the actual message conveyed by the disclaimer
to the students and concluded that its primary effect was to "protect
and maintain a particular religious viewpoint, namely belief in the
Biblical version of creation." '  It reasoned that: (1) the disclaimer
disavowed the endorsement of the scientific theory of evolution and
simultaneously urged students to consider alternative theories; (2)
reminded students that they were free to adopt their parent's beliefs;
and (3) left students with the "Biblical version of creation" as the
only alternative theory explicitly recognized.128 The basic conclusion
of the court was that the disclaimer encouraged students to consider,
in general, the possibility of alternative theories regarding the origin
of man and, in particular, to focus attention on the "Biblical version
of creation.' ' 129 According to the Court, to focus students' attention
on religion was to unconstitutionally give preference to religion in
violation of the Establishment Clause.
To clarify its decision, the court briefly discussed examples of
permissible uses of religion in schools. 3 ' Objective, secular
122. Id. at 346.
123. Id. At this point, the court noted that the second prong of the Lemon test
is quite similar to the inquiry under the endorsement test, and that in performing
either inquiry, the court must strike down the legislation if it gives "aid [to] one
religion, aid [to] all religions, or favor[s] one religion over another." Id.
124. See County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union Greater
Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 605, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3107 (1989) (proposing
that the Establishment Clause "certainly means at the very least that government
may not demonstrate apreference for one particular sect or creed .... ") (emphasis
added).




129. Id. Because the only example given of alternative, "other concepts" was
the "Biblical version of creation," the court felt that this supported its conclusion
that "the disclaimer impermissibly advance[d] religion." Id. at 346 n.4.
130. 185 F.3d at 347 (quoting Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39,42, 101 S. Ct. 192,
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discussions of religion during lectures on history, literature, or
philosophy, are acceptable presentations of religion in public schools
and do not violate the Establishment Clause.' 3 Instead of using the
reference to religion in an objective manner meant to provide context
for a discussion of politics, history, art, civilization, or the like, the
court concluded that the disclaimer's use of the words "Biblical
version of creation" was meant to urge students to think critically
about religious theories of man's origin and to draw attention away
from the state-mandated evolution curriculum.132
Finally, the court addressed the School Board's argument that any
advancement of or benefit to religion was purely incidental.'3
Summarily rejecting this argument, the court reasoned that the
disclaimer, while simultaneously disavowing the endorsement of
evolution and urging students to contemplate alternative religious
concepts, "serve[d] only to promote a religious alternative to
evolution."'3'  Therefore, the effect of the disclaimer was to
unconstitutionally advance religion, thereby failing the second prong
of the Lemon test (and thus the whole test) and the endorsement test
as well. 131
Having failed to defend its disclaimer at the appellate level, the
Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education petitioned the United States
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. However, the United States
Supreme Court passed on the opportunity to review the Fifth
Circuit's decision. Justice Scalia, with whom the Chief Justice and
Justice Thomas joined, dissented and articulated reasons why the
Supreme Court should have taken the case and how it should have
ruled.13
6
V. JUSTICE SCALIA'S DISSENT
Justice Scalia began his dissent with a brief summary of the Fifth
Circuit's decision and then expressed his disapproval for the Lemon
test employed by that court. ' He noted that not only himself, but a
majority of the members of the Supreme Court, disapproved of the
194 (1980)) ("[T]here is a fundamental difference between introducing religion and
religious concepts in 'an appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics,
comparative religion, or the like' and the reading of the School Board-mandated
disclaimer now before us.").
131. Id.
132. 185 F.3d at 347.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 348.
135. Id.
136. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ. v. Freiler, 530 U.S. 1251, 120 S. Ct. 2706
(2000).
137. Id. at 1252-55, 120 S. Ct. at 2708.
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Lemon test, and thus, certiorari should have been granted, even if
only "to inter the Lemon test once and for all."' 38
Putting his dissatisfaction with the Lemon test aside, Justice
Scalia began to analyze whether the Fifth Circuit had even applied
the test properly in the Freiler case. He concluded that it had not.'39
Justice Scalia pointed out that this erroneous application alone should
have warranted the granting of certiorari.r4° Because the Fifth
Circuit found a genuine secular purpose in the School Board's
disclaimer, there was no need to reconsider the first prong of the
Lemon test. Therefore, Justice Scalia moved straight to a close
examination of the second prong--deciding whether the principal or
primary effect of the state's action either advanced or inhibited
religion. 141
Looking to the plain text of the disclaimer, Justice Scalia
observed that, far from advancing religion, the "'principal or primary
effect' of the disclaimer at issue here is merely to advance freedom
of thought.' 42  He first noted that the disclaimer operated to
repudiate the School Board's endorsement of any single theory
regarding the origin of life, and that it did not affirmatively endorse
any religious theory of man's origin. 43 Next, he explained that the
only reference to religion in the entire disclaimer was the phrase
"Biblical version of creation," and that this phrase was simply the
most obvious example of an alternative "concept" that the teaching
of evolution was "not intended to influence or dissuade."' 44 In
Justice Scalia's opinion, because the disclaimer never again referred
to the "Biblical version of creation," never elaborated on what this
phrase meant, affirmed that "it [was] the basic right and privilege of
each student to form his/her own opinion," and concluded by
encouraging each student to "closely examine each alternative"
before forming an opinion, the disclaimer was sufficiently neutral to
comport with the Constitution and in no way advanced or showed
preferential treatment towards a religion.144
Justice Scalia next turned to the Fifth Circuit's conclusion'46 and
noted that it "lack[ed] any support in the text of the invalidated








146. Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337, 346 (5th 1999)
("The disclaimer... encourages students to read and meditate upon religion in
general and the 'Biblical version of creation' in particular.")
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[disclaimer]. ,1 47 To Justice Scalia, the disclaimer merely reminded
students of their right to maintain their own beliefs or their parent's
beliefs regarding the origin ofmankind. 48 The School Board was not
endorsing religion; "[a]t bottom, the disclaimer constitut[ed] nothing
more than 'simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held
among the people of this country. ,,149 Meant only to inform students
that the theory of evolution is not the sole explanation of the origin
of life and to remind them of their right to follow their own religious
principles instead, the disclaimer should have survived constitutional
inquiry.
Justice Scalia could find only one conceivable reason for the Fifth
Circuit's decision-the phrase "Biblical version of creation." But
said Justice Scalia, "[t]o think that this reference to (and plainly not
endorsement of) a reality of religious literature-and this use of an
example.., most likely to come into play-somehow converts the
otherwise innocuous disclaimer into an establishment of religion is
quite simply absurd."'5
The dissent closes with a succinct summary of the slippery slope
that Establishment Clause jurisprudence is hurdling down. Justice
Scalia first mentioned Epperson v. Arkansas'.' where the Supreme
Court struck down a statute that forbade any teaching of the theory
of evolution in public schools. Next, he cited Edwards v.
Aguillard,52 where the Supreme Court invalidated a statute that
required balanced time for teaching the theories of evolution and
creationism in public schools. Finally, he acknowledged the extreme
step the Supreme Court had just taken by refusing to grant certiorari.
Justice Scalia expressed disapproval of the Fifth Circuit's decision
barring a school district from "even suggesting to students that other
theories besides evolution-including, but not limited to, the Biblical
theory of creation-are worthy of their consideration." 53
VI. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT MISAPPLIED THE LEMON TEST
Justice Scalia was correct to point out the Fifth Circuit's
erroneous conclusion based on its application of the Lemon test.
However, given the "criticized" and "ignored" status of the Lemon
147. 530 U.S. at 1254, 120 S. Ct. at 2708.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1254, 120 S. Ct. at 2709 (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,
792, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3336 (1983)).
150. Id. at 1255, 120 S. Ct. at 2709.
151. 393 U.S. 97, 89 S. Ct. 266 (1968).
152. 482 U.S. 578, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987).
153. 530 U.S. at 1255, 120 S. Ct. at 2709.
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test,154 it is not surprising that a court might reach such an incorrect
conclusion. In all fairness to the Fifth Circuit, one could argue that
it did the best it could with such an inadequate test. 155 But, even if
one was to assume that the Lemon test was the proper test to apply,
the Fifth Circuit was still mistaken in its application of that test.
The first inquiry of the Lemon test asks whether the controversial
state activity has a secular purpose. In Freiler the Fifth Circuit
correctly found that the second and third purposes 156 advanced by the
School Board in support of the disclaimer were valid secular
purposes. But, the court was incorrect in finding that the School
Board's first stated purpose was a sham and, thus, without a secular
purpose. As its first articulated reason, the School Board stated that
the disclaimer served "to encourage informed freedom of belief. 1 57
Taking into account the actual text of the disclaimer, it is amazing
that the Fifth Circuit could deny the sincerity of this statement, for it
plainly states that "[s]tudents are urged to exercise critical thinking
and gather all information possible and closely examine each
alternative toward forming an opinion.', 5 1
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the disclaimer as a whole had a
contrary purpose: "the protection and maintenance of a particular
religious viewpoint.' ' 159 However, the court's conclusion did not come
from reading the whole disclaimer. The court first noted the School
Board's statement disclaiming the theory of evolution as being the sole
theory of man's origin and then focused on the School Board's
reassurance to children that the lesson on evolution was not intended to
"influence or dissuade the Biblical version of Creation or any other
concept."'' From these two clauses, the court gathered that the
disclaimer as a whole told children "that evolution as taught in the
classroom need not affect what they already [knew]."' 16 ' This
conclusion may be correct, but absent a more careful reading of the
disclaimer's second half, the court stretched it into an incorrect decision
that the disclaimer did not actually encourage critical thinking.
154. See Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ. 185 F.3d 337,344 (5th 1999)
(referring to the Lemon test as "widely criticized and occasionally ignored").
155. Under the principle of precedent, the Fifth Circuit was compelled to apply
the Lemon test to the disclaimer in Freiler. As Justice Rehnquist observed, "unless
we wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system, a precedent of [the
Supreme] Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no matter how
misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be." Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S.
370, 375, 102 S. Ct. 703, 706 (1982). Because the Fifth Circuit was compelled to
apply Lemon, it is not fair to criticize the court for doing so.
156. See supra note 113.
157. Id.
158. Freiler, 185 F.3d at 341.
159. Id. at 344-45.
160. Id. at 345.
161. Id.
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In the second part of the disclaimer, the School Board explicitly
wrote, "it is the basic right and privilege of each student to form
his/her own opinion," and the students were urged "to exercise
critical thinking and gather all information possible and closely
examine each alternative toward forming an opinion."16 The School
Board basically told the children to: (1) get all the information they
could; (2) examine it all carefully; and (3) use the information to
form their own opinions. If, as the Fifth Circuit said, the disclaimer
told students that evolution as taught in the classroom did not have to
affect what they believed (and it does not), and if students were
clearly told to "exercise critical thinking" and to "closely examine
each alternative," then the most logical conclusion to be drawn is that
the disclaimer did in fact further the School Board's first articulated
purpose, namely "to encourage informed freedom of belief." The
disclaimer reassured children that the School Board recognized that
multiple theories of man's origin exist and encouraged children to
examine all the evidence in order to decide for themselves. What
else is this if not encouragement of critical thinking?
The Fifth Circuit also erred when it evaluated the second prong
of the Lemon test. This prong analyzes whether, irrespective of
purpose, "the practice under review in fact conveys a message of
endorsement." ' The School Board said that its disclaimer advanced
"freedom of thought"'" as opposed to religion. The Fifth Circuit
disagreed, and instead found that the disclaimer impermissibly
advanced religion.'65
As Justice Scalia pointed out, the only possible justification for
the Fifth Circuit's decision rests in the use of the phrase "Biblical
version of Creation."' 66 If not for this poignant little phrase, there
would be no controversy here. However, courts have held that mere
objective reference to religion or a religious topic is not an
Establishment Clause violation per se.167 According to the Supreme
Court, a big difference exists between advancing religion in schools
and introducing religion or religious concepts in "an appropriate
study of history, civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or the
like." 6 Quite often, a study of religion or religious ideas is critical
162. 185 F.3d at 341 (emphasis added).
163. Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 817 (5th Cir. 1999).
164. Freiler, 185 F.3d at 346.
165. Id. at 348.
166. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ. v. Freiler, 530 U.S. 1251, 1255, 120 S. Ct.
2706, 2709 (2000).
167. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39,42, 101 S. Ct. 192, 194 (1980); Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 606-07, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2590 (1987) (Powell, J.,
concurring); School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 300, 83 S. Ct.
1560, 1612 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
168. Stone, 449 U.S. at42, 101 S. Ct. at 194.
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to understanding the subject matter of courses like history,
philosophy, art, literature, or politics.
Why then should things be any different in the context of
studying the origins of man? It is appropriate when introducing a
scientific theory (such as evolution) to at least acknowledge the
existence of other, competing theories (like creationism). As long as
the Biblical version of creation is neutrally and objectively presented
as a viable alternative for students to consider after gathering all of
the facts, and not actively endorsed or taught as being the sole truth,
there should be no Establishment Clause violation.
Unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit did not view the phrase "Biblical
version of creation" as an acceptable, neutral exposition of a
competing theory; instead, it viewed it as an advancement of religion.
The Fifth Circuit's reasoning can be condensed as follows: (1) the
School Board disclaimed that evolution was the single theory of
man's origin while simultaneously setting forth the fact that
alternative theories existed; (2) the disclaimer reminded students that
they could believe as they wanted to; and (3) the only alternative to
evolution explicitly given was the "Biblical version of Creation."
From this, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the disclaimer
"encourage[d] students to read and meditate upon religion in general
and the 'Biblical version of Creation' in particular.""' This
reasoning is unsound. The Fifth Circuit read more into the text of the
disclaimer than was actually there, and it was able to do this by
ignoring the disclaimer's last paragraph.
By looking no further than the text of the disclaimer, it is readily
apparent that it did not advance religion, and in no way did it
encourage students to "read and meditate upon religion.' 170 The
principal effect was simply to explain to students their options and
encourage them to think freely about multiple theories of man's
origin. Rather than affirmatively endorsing a religious viewpoint, the
disclaimer merely distanced the School Board from an exclusive
endorsement of the scientific theory and allowed students to make an
informed decision on their own. The School Board did not solely
support the scientific theory of evolution and stated that it was fine
for students to consider other theories of man's origin, like, for
example, the Biblical version of creation.
At most, reference to the phrase "Biblical version of creation" is
an illustrative, neutral reference to the most popular alternative
theory of man's origin. It is highly likely that an average person, if
asked to name any alternative theory to evolution, would name
169. 185 F.3d at 346.
170. See Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ. v. Freiler, 530 U.S. 1251, 1253, 120
S. Ct. 2706, 2708 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("the 'principal or primary effect'
of the disclaimer at issue here is merely to advance freedom of thought").
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creationism. By using this phrase as an illustration, the School Board
was not giving its endorsement to the Biblical version of creation;
instead, it was simply exposing its existence to the students as a
competing theory. To merely bring a competing theory to the surface
is not the same as affirmatively advancing it. Justice Scalia was
correct when he noted that the Fifth Circuit's conclusion "lack[ed]
any support in the text of the invalidated document."17
In the alternative, assuming that the Fifth Circuit was correct to
conclude that the disclaimer benefited religion, it would still be
incorrect to declare the disclaimer unconstitutional. As previously
discussed, "where the benefit to religion.., is no more than indirect,
remote, or incidental,"'172 there is "no realistic danger that the
community would think that the [contested state practice] was
endorsing religion or any particular creed."'77 The Freiler disclaimer
simply acknowledged the existence of the creationism alternative and
in no way attempted to expand upon this theory. Quite simply, the
disclaimer did not actively teach, promote, or advance religion, and
any benefit the disclaimer gave to religion through this miniscule
publicity was no more than "indirect, remote, or incidental."
The Supreme Court has never before held that the government
cannot acknowledge the existence of a religious viewpoint. Instead,
the Court has always interpreted the Establishment Clause to
accommodate religion. 174 The Constitution does not require complete
separation of church and state; the government is not required to
acknowledge only the secular "to the exclusion and so to the
detriment of the religious.' 75 This means that the government can
171. Id. at 1254, 120 S. Ct. at 2708.
172. Freiler, 185 F.3d at 346.
173. Id. (citing Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384, 395, 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2148 (1993)).
174. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,657, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3135 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("Rather than requiring government to avoid any
action that acknowledges or aids religion, the Establishment Clause permits
government some latitude in recognizing and accommodating the central role
religion plays in our society."). See also Santa Fe Independent Sch. Dist. v. Doe,
530 U.S. 290,323, 120 S. Ct. 2266,2286 (2000) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("That
a policy tolerates religion does not mean that it improperly endorses it" such that
the Establishment Clause is violated.); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233, 117
S. Ct. 1997, 2015 (1997) ("Interaction between church and state is inevitable, and
we have always tolerated some level of involvement between the two."); Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,70, 105 S. Ct. 2479,2497 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("The endorsement test does not preclude government from acknowledging religion
or from taking religion into account in making law and policy."); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1359 (1984) (The constitution
"affinmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and
forbids hostility toward any").
175. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 657, 109 S. Ct. at 3135 (Stevens, J.,
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acknowledge or even accommodate a religious viewpoint in a public
school'. 6  Therefore, the Tangipahoa disclaimer that simply
acknowledged the existence of the religious theory to mankind's
creation should be upheld as constitutional.
There is additional support outside the text of the disclaimer that
reinforces the proposition that the School Board was not actively
endorsing religion via the disclaimer adopted on April 19, 1994.
Prior to the disclaimer, in December 1993, the School Board
considered adopting a policy that would have actually allowed the
teaching of alternative theories of man's origin, like creationism, in
public schools.177 However, this policy was defeated early on at the
committee stage.' In March 1994, the School Board again rejected
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
176. Id. at 657, 109 S. Ct. at 3135 ("Government policies of accommodation,
acknowledgment, and support for religion are an accepted part of our political and
cultural heritage."), see also Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 72 S. Ct. 679 (1952).
Justice Douglas wrote for the Court:
When the state encourages religious instruction ... it follows the best of
our traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our people and
accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs. To hold that it
may not would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the
government show a callous indifference to religious groups. That would
be preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do believe.
Id. at 313-14, 72 S. Ct. at 684. See also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 112 S. Ct.
2649 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring):
In everyday life, we routinely accommodate religious beliefs that we do
not share. ... In so acting, we express respect for, but not endorsement of,
the fundamental values of others. We act without expressing a position on
the theological merit of those values or of religious belief in general, and
no one perceives us to have taken such a position. The government may
act likewise.
Id. at 628, 112 S. Ct. at 2677 (emphasis added). See also Abington Sch. Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306, 83 S. Ct. 1560, 1615 (1963) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) ("Neither government nor this Court can or should ignore the
significance of the fact that a vast portion of our ... legal, political and personal
values derive historically from religious teachings. Government must inevitably
take cognizance of the existence of religion.") (emphasis added); Griswold, supra
note 21, at 174:
It is perfectly true, and highly salutary, that the First Amendment forbade
Congress to pass any law "respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof." These are great provisions, of great
sweep and basic importance. But to say that they require that all trace of
religion be kept out of any sort of public activity is sheer invention....
Does our deep-seated tolerance of all religions--or, to the same extent, of
no religion-require that we give up all religious observance in public
activities? Why should it? It certainly never occurred to the Founders that
it would.
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a similar, revised policy that would have allowed teachers to teach
creation science. Instead, the School Board passed four other items,
one of which expressly provided that "no religious belief or non-
belief should be promoted or disparaged by the school system. 179
Thus, the School Board twice rejected proposals to advance religion
in public schools and instead adopted a resolution expressing an
intent to do exactly the opposite by not promoting religion in schools.
It is hard to believe that only one month later the School Board could
summarily reverse this thinking and adopt a policy that actively
advanced religion in the public schools.
The last error in the Fifth Circuit's decision was its statement that
"the disclaimer impermissibl' advance[d] religion [and] thereby
violat[ed] the second prong of the Lemon test as well as the
endorsement test."'8° As Justice Scalia pointed out, the Fifth Circuit
gave absolutely no elaboration as to what they meant by this
statement. 8 1 Because the Lemon test and the endorsement test are
two separate inquiries, it was error to conclude, without any support
for doing so, that by failing the second prong of the Lemon test, the
state's action automatically failed the endorsement test. If both tests
are passed, or failed, based on the same set of facts and
circumstances, courts have no reason to make a distinction between
the tests in the first place.
VII. CHOOSING THE RIGHT TEST: LEMON, ENDORSEMENT AND
COERCION
Perhaps the most serious error in Freiler was that the Fifth Circuit
misapplied the Lemon test in such a way that the court missed the big
picture. Rather than stepping back and viewing the disclaimer as a
neutral, modest explanation of choices, the court was jumping at
"mere shadows."18 2- Though mindful of Epperson and Aguillard, the
Fifth Circuit was not mindful of the purposes woven within the
Establishment Clause. 8 3 Roger Williams, Thomas Jefferson, and
179. Id.
180. Id. at 348 (emphasis added).
181. Tangipahoa ParishBd. ofEduc. v. Freiler, 530U.S. 1251, 1252, 120 S. Ct.
2706, 2708 (2000).
182. As observed by Justice Goldberg, "the measure of constitutional
adjudication is the ability and willingness to distinguish between real threat and
mere shadow." Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,308, 83 S. Ct. 1560,
1616 (1963) (concurring opinion).
183. See supra notes 70-71. For more modem interpretations of the purposes
behind the Establishment Clause, see County of Allegheny v. American Civil
Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 646, 109 S. Ct. 3086,
3129 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("It was ...
nonpreferential assistance to organized churches that constituted 'establishment of
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James Madison were all adamant about separating church from state.
Williams worried that if the two mixed, the state could persecute
religion. Jefferson believed in strict religious liberty and freedom of
conscience, and he believed the state had no jurisdiction over
religion. Madison was concerned that state involvement in religion
would create faction. These ideals are all within the Establishment
Clause, and the Framers made the Establishment Clause's purpose
clear-to insure that "no man shall be compelled to frequent or
support any religious worship, place, or ministry.""'
With this purpose behind the Establishment Clause, why was the
simple disclaimer declared unconstitutional? It would not have
offended Roger Williams, for it favors individual freedom with
respect to religion, an ideal embraced by Mr. Williams. And, it
would not have bothered Thomas Jefferson, for the disclaimer
encourages religious liberty and freedom of conscience by keeping
children apprised of all of their options when searching for the truth
behind the origin of mankind. Likewise, James Madison would have
found no fault in the disclaimer, for it can hardly be argued that it
could inspire men to form factions.
In fact, the disclaimer does not upset the purposes within the
Establishment Clause. The Fifth Circuit held that it did, but this
conclusion was the result of a faulty application of the Lemon test.
Had the court applied the endorsement and coercion tests instead, it
is likely the court would have reached a proper result.
As noted by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Lemon test "has had a
checkered career in the decisional law of [the Supreme Court]."' 5
Over the years, many Justices have expressed their disapproval of the
Lemon test.186 Justice Scalia was prepared to grant certiorari in
religion' in 1791, and it was this practice that the amendment forbade Congress to
adopt."); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668, 90 S. Ct. 1409, 1411 (1970)
(The purpose of the Establishment Clause is to prevent the establishment of
religion. "[F]or the men who wrote the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment
the 'establishment' of a religion connoted sponsorship, financial support, and active
involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 49, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2485 (1985) ("As is plain from its text, the First
Amendment was adopted to curtail the power of Congress to interfere with the
individual's freedom to believe, to worship, and to express himself in accordance
with the dictates of his own conscience."); id. at 75, 105 S. Ct. at 2500 (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (The purpose of the Establishment Clause is to assure "that
government not intentionally endorse religion or a religious practice").
184. See supra note 70.
185. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290,319, 120 S. Ct. 2266,2284
(2000) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
186. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 398, 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2149 (1993) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up
in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon
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Freiler even "if only to take the opportunity to inter the Lemon test
once for all."' 17 On the other hand, many Justices have expressed
their approval of the alternative endorsement and coercion tests. 88
Therefore, it is logical to conclude that the Supreme Court should
cease using the Lemon test and should instead replace this tool with
the endorsement and coercion tests when measuring alleged
Establishment Clause violations. Given the historical purposes
behind the Establishment Clause, these two tests are better at
revealing state actions that violate its mandate.
The endorsement test asks if the challenged action "conveys a
message that religion is 'favored,' 'preferred,' or 'promote[d]' over
other beliefs."' 9 If such a message is conveyed, the state action is
unconstitutional. This inquiry is a more accurate measure of an
Establishment Clause violation than the Lemon test. As Roger
Williams said, if the government can use religion, then the
government can corrupt it. 9° If the government can send a message
that religion is "favored, preferred, or promoted," then the
government can use this power to corrupt religion. And as Thomas
Jefferson and James Madison agreed, the government lacks alljurisdiction to favor, prefer, or promote religion. Therefore, any
legislation enacted by a state that favors, prefers, or promotes religion
stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence."); County of Allegheny v. American
Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 655-657, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 3134-35 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68-69, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2496 (1985) (O'Connor,J., concurring) ("Despite its initial promise, the Lemon test has proved problematic
... the standards announced in Lemon should be reexamined and refined in order
to make them more useful in achieving the underlying purpose of the FirstAmendment."); id. at 108-12, 105 S. Ct. at 2516-19 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (Because the Lemon test is not grounded in the history surrounding the
adoption of the Establishment Clause, this "three-part test has simply not provided
adequate standards for deciding Establishment Clause cases, as this Court has
slowly come to realize."); Committee for Public Ed. and Religious Liberty v.Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671, 100 S. Ct. 840, 856 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)(deriding "the sisyphean task of trying to patch together the 'blurred, indistinct, and
variable barrier' described in Lemon").
187. 530 U.S. 1251, 1253, 120 S. Ct. 2706, 2708 (2000).188. See County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union GreaterPittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 627-629, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3119-3120 (1989)(O'Connor, J., joined by Brennan, J., and Stevens, J., concurring) ("the
endorsement test captures the essential command of the Establishment Clause,
namely, that government must not make a person's religious beliefs relevant to his
or her standing in the political community by conveying a message 'that religion
or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred' ); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.577, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (the majority adopted the "coercion test" to analyze
whether state sponsored prayer at graduation violated the First Amendment).
189. County ofAllegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union Greater PittsburghChapter, 492 U.S. 573, 594, 109 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). See also supra note 75.190. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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violates the purposes woven into the Establishment Clause and
should be declared unconstitutional. This test is also more consistent
than the Lemon test. 9' The Lemon test begins with an inquiry into
whether the state's action lacks a secular legislative purpose. This
process involves the "sham" inquiry.' An investigation into the
intent of the drafters of legislation is required, and such investigation
cannot be completely accurate. First, such inquiry is fraught with
uncertainty and speculation. Second, it is quite easy for legislators
to state their purpose while keeping a hidden agenda. Next, the court
asks whether the state action "advances" religion.' 3 Again, this
inquiry is highly subjective and is prone to misinterpretation of
legislation, as was done in Freiler.
The coercion test'94 is also better at evaluating Establishment
Clause violations than the Lemon test. It merely analyzes the
coercive effect that state-sponsored religious activity has on the
public. If government sponsored activity pressures citizens to
participate in a' religious activity, then that activity is
unconstitutional. This test comports exactly with the purposes behind
the Establishment Clause--"that no man shall be compelled to
frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry."'95 The
Framers of the Establishment Clause did not want the government to
compel or to coerce people to participate in religion. Any state
activity that does so is unconstitutional. This test is neutral and
objective and is a better measure of an Establishment Clause
violation than the more subjective Lemon test.
VIII. FORMING A NEW TEST-REEVALUATING FREILER
Because the endorsement and coercion tests are superior to the
Lemon test, the Lemon test should be interred,'96 and a new, simpler
191. See County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union Greater
Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 629, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3120 (1989) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) ("[T]he endorsement test is capable of consistent application.");
Tanina Rostain, PermissibleAccommodations ofReligion: Reconsidering the New
York "Get" Statute, 96 Yale L.J. 1147, 1160 (1987) (stating that the endorsement
test "provides a standard capable of consistent application and avoids the criticism
leveled against the Lemon test").
192. See supra note 74.
193. Id.
194. See supra note 76.
195. Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, 12 Hening, Statutes of Virginia 84
(1823) (emphasis added). See also supra note 54.
196. As Justice Rehnquist noted, "if a constitutional theory has no basis in the
history of the amendment it seeks to interpret, is difficult to apply and yields
unprincipled results, [there is] little use in it." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112,




test should rise to take its place. 97 The new test should be a two-
pronged test comprised of the endorsement and coercion tests.'
Using it, a court would perform a two-step inquiry to determine the
effect of challenged legislation. A court would first ask whether the
legislation coerces citizens into participating in religion in any way.
If it does, the law is unconstitutional. If not, the court should move
to prong two and ask whether the legislation favors, prefers, or
promotes religion. If it does, the law must fail. If not, then the law
survives and is constitutional. This new test comports well with the
true purposes behind the Establishment Clause.
Had Freiler been evaluated under the coercion and endorsement
tests, the Fifth Circuit would likely have reached a different result.
Starting with the coercion test, it is plain to see that the disclaimer
does not coerce students to participate in a religious activity. Under
the coercion test, a school-sponsored activity contravenes the
Establishment Clause when "(1) the government directs (2) a formal
religious exercise (3) in such a way as to oblige the participation of
objectors."' 99 By allowing the disclaimer to be read, the Tangipahoa
Parish Board of Education was not directing a formal religious
exercise that obliged school children to participate. Children were
not obliged to learn about the Biblical version of creation; instead,
they were simply informed that alternative theories of mankind's
197. Many members of the Court disagree that a single test should be employed
to evaluate alleged Establishment Clause violations. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 678-79, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1362 (1984) ("In each [Establishment Clause] case,
the inquiry calls for line drawing; no fixed,perse rule can be framed... [W]e have
repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be confined to any single test or
criterion in [the Establishment Clause] area"). However, in virtually every
Establishment Clause case decided since Lemon, the Court has applied the Lemon
test to the dissatisfaction of many of its members. Though the Court says it does
not want to be tied to a single standard, its pattern in the past has been to use the
single Lemon test standard. Therefore, the suggestion that the Court adopt a better,
all-encompassing standard is not unthinkable.
198. See County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union Greater
Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 659, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3136 (1989). In his
concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens inadvertently recognized this
combined test. According to Justice Stevens:
Our cases disclose two limiting principles: government may not coerce
anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise; and it
may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give
direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact establishes a[state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.
Id. (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678, 104 S. Ct. at 1361) (emphasis added). The two
limiting principles are basically the coercion and endorsement tests. Therefore, it
would not be a stretch to combine these two standards into one workable test for
courts to use in the future.
199. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963,970 (5th Cir. 1992).
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origin exist, such as creationism, and they were told that it was their
choice as to which theory they would believe. This message is not
coercive.
Having passed the coercion test, the disclaimer should then be
analyzed under the endorsement test. In Freiler, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that because the disclaimer violated the second prong of
the Lemon test, it simultaneously failed the endorsement test.
However, the Fifth Circuit gave no support for this conclusion.
This disclaimer in no way endorses religion. The government
violates the endorsement test when it "conveys a message that
religion is 'favored,' 'preferred,' or 'promoted' over other beliefs."
The Freiler disclaimer sent no such message. Very briefly, the
disclaimer informed school children that the theory of evolution was
not the only theory of man's origin, that other theories, such as
creationism, existed, and that they were free to explore and
contemplate other theories on their own. This message is not one of
endorsement; the government is not putting its stamp of approval on
the Biblical version of creation. The Tangipahoa Parish Board of
Education simply stated a known fact-that religions have alternative
views about the creation of mankind. This statement is simply a
neutral and objective expression of reality.
In the past, schools could constitutionally tell children of the
impact religion had on history, art, philosophy, law, and so forth.
Why is the same not true with regard to mankind's origin? As long
as the state neutrally and objectively apprises children of religion's
interplay in other subjects, a neutral and objective statement that
religions have various theories for man's beginnings on Earth should
also be allowed. This does not endorse religion; it merely
acknowledges the fact that religions exist, and that they do not always
agree with scientific theory.
IX. CONCLUSION
As recognized by Erwin Griswold, the absolutist viewpoint "is
more likely to lead us into darkness than to light."2°° In Freiler, the
Fifth Circuit adopted its own false absolute and, as Mr. Griswold
could have predicted, reached the wrong result. The Supreme Court
200. Griswold, supra note 21, at 168. According to Mr. Griswold,
[A]bsolutes are likely to be phantoms, eluding our grasp. Even if we
think we have embraced them, they are likely to be misleading. If we
start from absolute premises, we may find that we only oversimplify
our problems and thus reach unsound results. It may well be that
absolutes are the greatest hindrance to sound and useful thought-in
law, as in other fields of human knowledge.
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should have caught the Fifth Circuit's mistake, corrected the result,
and used Freiler as an opportunity to reconcile the inconsistent
standards surrounding Establishment Clause jurisprudence today.
The true nature of the issue is whether the disclaimer is a
prohibited "law respecting an establishment of religion.""'' This
question is the heart of the inquiry. Using the Lemon test, the Fifth
Circuit answered the question in the affirmative. However, this
conclusion was an error, for the Lemon test is not as accurate a
measure of Establishment Clause violations as are the coercion and
endorsement tests-tests which accurately measure up to the
principles and purposes framed within the Establishment Clause.
When one steps back and looks at the text of the disclaimer, the
prohibition in the Establishment Clause, and the intent of the men
who drafted it, it is plain to see that the disclaimer is a neutral and
objective statement that alternative religious viewpoints do indeed
exist. It is by no means a "law respecting an establishment of
religion."2 To conclude otherwise requires the adoption of an
absolutist approach. The correct conclusion, on the other hand,
requires the more difficult task of construing the text of the
Establishment Clause in a way that comports with the history
surrounding it and the intent of the men who drafted it.
When the Framers drafted the First Amendment, they
contemplated separation between church and state, meaning that the
state could not endorse religion or coerce citizens into participation.
They never contemplated the direction Freiler would take-that the
state could no longer even acknowledge religion's existence. There
are many instances in daily life where religion and government are
allowed to mix: "chaplains in Congress and in the armed forces;
chapels in prisons; 'In God We Trust' on our money."20 3 There are
also more specific examples where religion and government support
to schools coincide: public money spent for textbooks supplied
throughout the country to students attending church-sponsored
schools; public money spent for transportation of students to church-
sponsored schools; federal grants for college buildings at church-
sponsored institutions; and federal grants to church-sponsored
universities.2 Public schools have even been allowed to release
students during the day for religion classes at other institutions.2"'
The disclaimer in Freiler is no more a violation of the
Constitution than any of these previously tolerated accommodations
201. U.S. Const. amend. I.
202. Id.
203. Griswold, supra note 21, at 174.
204. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681-82, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1363-1364(1984).
205. Zorach v. Clausson, 343 U.S. 306, 72 S. Ct. 679 (1952).
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of religion. It coerces no one, and it is of no greater aid or benefit to
religion than any of the before mentioned practices. Therefore, it
should be constitutional. Unless our Supreme Court revises the
Establishment Clause standards to comport with the purposes
underlying the Establishment Clause, more absolutist decisions like
Freiler are apt to occur. The wall of separation has been built too
high; the time is ripe for the Court to begin lowering it.
Todd D. Keator

